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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of copayments on doctor visits using the
German health care reform of 2004 as a natural experiment.In January 2004,
copayments of 10 euros for the first doctor visit in each quarter have been
introduced for all adults in the statutory health insurance.Individuals covered
by private health insurance as well as youths have been exempted from these
copayments. We use them as control groups in a difference-in-differences
approachtoidentifythecausalimpactofthesecopaymentsondoctorvisits.In
contrast to expectations and public opinion our results indicate that there are
no statistically significant effects of the copayments on the decision of visiting
a doctor.
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In many developed countries, health care expenditures have increased more
rapidly than GDP in the last decades. The sources of this increase in health
care expenditures are manifold.First,technical progress in medicine allows to
cure formerly incurable illnesses and to reduce mortality but also increases
total costs of the health care system. Second, the demographic change in
Germany already led to an ageing population which, on average, results in a
higher demand for medical services and products. Since contribution rates to
socialhealthinsuranceinGermanyarelinkedtosalaries,healthcarecoststhat
increase more than salaries lead to higher contribution rates and, thus, to a
higher burden for both employees and employers. Furthermore, constantly
highunemploymentinGermany,whichmightbepartlyaresultofhighcontri-
bution rates, reduces revenues of the social health insurance companies
adding further pressure on the contribution rates.
Against this background,the German government initiated five major health
care reforms in the 1990s to stop contribution rates from further rising.
Despitetheseeffortsaveragecontributionratesincreasedfrom13.2%in1995
to 14.3% in 2003 (BMG 2005). Hence, in 2004 another health care reform
became effective.An important element of this reform – most controversially
discussed in the public – was the introduction of copayments for doctor visits
in order to reduce health care costs by creating an incentive to avoid unnec-
essary doctor visits. Since January 2004, each patient has to pay a flat rate of
10 euros per quarter once she visits a doctor.This paper aims at evaluating the
effectiveness of this policy measure.
For the US and Canada, numerous empirical studies exist on the effects of
copayments on the number of doctor visits.This literature evaluates the intro-
duction of copayments in these countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
such as, for example, the Group health plan introduced by the Stanford Uni-
versity in 1967,the Californian Medicaid program introduced in 1972,and the
introduction of copayments for doctor visits in the Canadian province
Saskatschewan in 1968. Overall, the results of these studies indicate that
copayments are indeed effective in reducing the number of doctor visits1.
Compared to North America, the evidence on the effects of copayments on
the usage of the health care system in Germany is rather small. The main
reasons for this lack of evidence is that copayments for the utilization of the
health care system have been introduced rather late if compared to the US or
Canada.Until 2004,only copayments for prescription drugs have been part of
the German health care system. Winkelmann (2004) uses the German health
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1 See, among others, Scitovsky, Snyder (1972); Scitovsky, McCall (1977); Beck (1974); Roemer,
Hopkins (1975);Cherkin et al.(1990).care reform of 1997 to examine the impact of copayments for prescription
drugs, which have been increased by up to 200% through this reform, on
doctor visits. Using a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the effects
of this reform, his results indicate that this policy measure decreased the
number of doctor visits by about 15%.
Similar to Winkelmann (2004),this paper uses a difference-in-differences ap-
proach to evaluate the effects of the introduction of copayments for doctor
visits. The next section describes the health reform of 2004 in more detail.
Section 3 presents the data and our identification strategy. The empirical
results are discussed in section 4.Section 5 concludes.
2. The German Health Reform 2004
In Germany, the social health insurance finances roughly 58% of the total
health expenditures of 240 billion euros (BMG 2005). Basically, social health
insuranceismandatoryforallemployedworkers.Yet,whenthesalaryexceeds
acertainthreshold,apersoncanchoosewhethertoremaininthesocialhealth
insurance system or to opt out and alternatively acquire private health in-
surance. Independently of their salary, civil servants and self-employed can
always choose between social and private health insurance.
The social health insurers calculate income-dependent premiums, so called
contribution rates,that do not correspond to individual risks.The payments of
the insured are equal to salaries times the contribution rate, up to an income
ceiling.Almosthalfofthepremiumispaidbyemployers;therestispaidbythe
employee. Roughly 250 health insurers compete with each other on the basis
of the contribution rate (Tamm et al. 2006). The average contribution rate in
2003 has been 14.3% (BMG 2005).While health expenditures rise more than
revenues raised by the premiums due to demographic change, technological
progress,unemployment,and system inefficiencies,contribution rates tend to
increase.Since the premiums substantially increase labor costs and might be a
cause for high unemployment in Germany, the government works against
rising contribution rates by regularly undertaking reforms to cut cost. In the
1990s,Germany has experienced five major health reforms.
Onthe1stofJanuary2004anewhealthreformbecameeffective,theso-called
Gesundheitsmodernisierungsgesetz (law to modernize the health system).
Amongst other policy measures it aimed at strengthening the personal re-
sponsibility of the insured and introduced a fee of 10 euros for the first doctor
visit in a quarter,which covers all therapies within this quarter.2 If the therapy
continues in the following quarter, the fee has to be paid again. If the patient
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2 Thequarterdoesnotstartwiththebeginningofthetherapybutisdefinedbythecalendar,with
the first quarter starting in January.consultsanotherdoctorwithouthavingbeenreferredtobythefirstone,again
another fee has to be paid even in the same quarter. Hence, total personal
annual expenditures might add up to 40 euros per therapy and year.
Total personal annual expenditures for health services, including e.g. expen-
ditures for pharmaceuticals or hospitals, are, however, capped at 2% of
personal gross income – adjusted for certain deductions. For patients with
chronic diseases total expenditures are capped at 1% of their gross income.
Consequently, patients with low income do not have to pay full copayments
for doctor visits. Furthermore, there are a few health insurers that exempt
their insured from the fee if they participate in certain health programs.
Children and teenagers until the age of 18 are exempted from the fee. In ad-
dition,personscoveredbyprivatehealthinsurancedonotpaythefeebecause
they do not belong to the social health system. Thus, youths and privately
insured were not affected by the reform and might serve as a valid control
group when evaluating the effect of the fee on doctor visits.
Giventhechangesofthereformof2004,weexpectthattheprobabilitytovisit
a doctor within a quarter decreases for adults covered by social health in-
surance. Yet, even though the total number of doctor visits should decrease,
the number of doctor visits of a person within a quarter should not be affected
conditional on having visited a doctor at least once in the quarter.It is unclear
whethertheeffectislargerorsmallerforpersonswithlowincome.Ontheone
hand,the probability to visit a doctor might decrease more for persons with a
low income, because the fee of 10 euros is relatively expensive for them. On
the other hand, their reaction might be weaker than average because total
health expenditures are capped by 2% of gross income.
3. Data and Methodology
To investigate the effects of the copayments introduced in 2004 on the proba-
bility of visting a doctor, we employ data from the German Socioeconomic
Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is an annual representative survey of indi-
viduals aged 16 and above which started in 1984.All individuals aged at least




of 2003.Thus,the answers given in 2004 cannot be used to evaluate the effect
of the introduction of copayments on doctor visits. We therefore abstained
from using data for the year 2004 and used only data for 2003 and 2005.
Table1displaysdescriptivestatisticsondoctorvisitsfordifferentsubgroupsin
our sample.The individuals were asked whether they visited any doctor in the
6 Boris Augurzky, Thomas K. Bauer and Sandra Schaffnerlast three months before the interview and about the number of doctor visits.
Between 2003 and 2005 the probability to visit a doctor stayed roughly
constant for adults covered by the social health insurance system, while
numbers increased slightly for those covered by private health insurance and
youths aged 17. The number of doctor visits in the last three months di-
minished slightly by approximately 3% between 2003 and 2005.
Table2displaysthenumberofcasesofmedicaltreatmentcollectedbyfourre-
gional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians.3 In all four
regions the number of cases of doctoral treatment decreased between 2003
and2005byroughly6to7%.Notethatwecompareonlythefiguresforthe3rd
quarter because the number of weekdays and holidays does not change over
time in this quarter. The decrease is somewhat larger than that reparted in
Table1.Althoughthedifferencesaresmalltheymightbeexplainedbythefol-
lowing.Individuals in the SOEP sample might count their doctor visits only if
they were medicated but not if they merely visited an office to get a pre-
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3 The 23 regional associations represent the health insurance physicians treating outpatients
(familyphysicians/generalspractitionersandspecialists).Theyrepresent145,300doctorsandpsy-
chotherapists.Theymanagethebillingprocedureofhealthcaredelivery,distributetheremunera-
tion and conduct contracts at state level with sickness funds and other health care providers.scription.The latter,however,are included in the case numbers of the Associ-
ations of Statutory Health Insurance. Thus, the observed small difference in
the number of doctor visits might be explained by the fact that the number of
cases without any medication decreased more than those with medication.
Thisexplanationappearstobequitereasonablebecausethecopaymentshave
to be paid for getting a prescription as well.Therefore,patients might attempt
to concentrate their visits and to get prescriptions for bigger package sizes.
More detailed statistics of the Associations of Statutory Health Insurance
Physicians show that the most pronounced decrease in case numbers is ob-
served for gynecologists. One reason for this decrease is that women have
changed from three months birth control pill packages to six months birth
control pill packages to avoid copayments every quarter.
We use the following variables to control for potential differences between
treatment and control group: gender, age, net household income, region,
marital status,employment status,highest educational achievement,children,
and hours worked per week.We exclude all individuals with missing values on
at least one of the variables resulting in a sample size of 18,094 observations
fortheyear2003and16,305observationsfortheyear2005.Summarystatistics
of these variables are provided in Table 6 in the Appendix.
Werelyonadifference-in-differencesapproachtoidentifythecausaleffectof
the introduction of copayments on doctor visits. The outcome variable is
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Summary Statistics of Doctor Visits in Four Regions
2003 to 2005,3rd quarter
2003 2004 2005
Hamburg
Medical specialists 2,084,253 1,944,188 1,924,407
Family doctors 968,310 933,711 927,779
Total 3,052,563 2,877,899 2,852,186
Hesse
Medical specialists 4,749,473 4,390,172 4,408,336
Family doctors 3,949,339 3,746,280 3,722,036
Total 8,698,812 8,136,452 8,130,372
Schleswig-Holstein
Medical specialists 2,314,967 2,145,345 2,188,071
Family doctors 1,818,182 1,728,378 1,702,785
Total 4,133,149 3,873,723 3,890,856
Westphalia-Lippe
Medical specialists 6,880,086 6,340,261 6,443,272
Family doctors 5,429,802 5,171,480 5,063,158
Total 12,309,888 11,511,741 11,506,430
Source:Data provided by the corresponding regional Association of Statutory Health Insurance
Physicians.
Table 2defined as a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the individual has
visited a doctor in the last three months and 0 otherwise. Note that this
variable perfectly reflects the incentives introduced by the copayments.After
the introduction of the copayments individuals have an incentive to avoid
doctorvisitsinaparticularquarteroftheyear.Oncetheyhavevisitedadoctor
in a quarter, additional doctor visits are not subject to the copayment
anymore,i.e.conditionalonhavingvisitedadoctorinaquarterthecopayment
should have no effect on further doctor visits.
In our empirical analysis,the treatment group includes all individuals covered
by statutory health insurance except youths younger than 18. 14,519 obser-
vations fall into this group. We use two different kinds of the control groups.
The first control group consists of all individuals covered by private health in-
surance who are at least 18 years old. 1,786 observations fall into this group.
Basedonthiscontrolgroupwespecifythefollowingfixedeffectslogitmodel
(1) YX D C D C it it it it it it i it =+ ++ × + + βγ δ δ α ε 01 () ,
whereYit istheoutcomevariableforindividualiattimetasdefinedabove.X it
is a vector of time-variant covariates including household net income,marital
status, employment status, number of children aged 6 or younger, hours
worked per week, and highest educational achievement. Dit is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 for observations in the year 2005 and 0 oth-
erwise,andCit is the treatment indicator taking the value 1 for adults covered
by statutory health insurance and 0 for adults covered by private health in-
surance.Finally,α i is an individual fixed effect that captures time invariant in-
dividual heterogeneity,ε it is the stochastic error term.The estimate ofδ1 is the
difference-in-difference estimator.
The second control group consists of 168 youths aged 17. In this case, we can
not employ the panel structure of the data set anymore because the control
group is time-variant due to its age restriction. Instead, we pool the data and
specify the following logit model
(2) YX D C DC t ii i i i i =+ ++ × + βγ δ δ ε 02 () ,
In this model, the DiD estimator is given by δ2 . As a specification check of
model (2), we restrict the treatment group to only 18 and 19 year old adults
becausetheyaremorecomparabletothecontrolgroupofyouthsaged17than
the whole group of adults.
The key identification assumption of the DiD approach is that the parameters
δ1 in model (1) and δ2 in model (2) are zero in the absence of the policy
change. This implies that the interaction term must be uncorrelated with the
error term. In other words, as the model only includes common time effects
Copayments in the German Health System 9captured by the dummy variable D, it has to be assumed that conditional on
the covariates X there are no unobserved time-varying determinants of the
outcome variables with a differential effect on the treatment and control
group. This assumption rules out, for example, that changes in the macro-
economic environment display different effects on the two groups or that
there are other policy changes that affect the two groups differently. This as-
sumption also rules out that persons covered by social health insurance
change the way they count the number of doctor visits because of the reform.
If this was the case our estimates would be biased towards zero.
AnothersubstantialpartoftheGermanhealthcarereformof2004wasthein-
crease of copayments on prescription drugs. Similar to the copayments on
doctor visits these copayments concern only patients of the social health in-
surance and might strengthen the effect of the copayments on doctor visits
(Winkelmann 2004). Other reforms introduced during 2003 and 2005 do not
concerndoctorvisits.Onlythelabormarketreformshaveapotentialeffecton
the health care systems because of the contribution rate that is linked to the
salaries.However,thereisnoargumenttoexpectthepaidpremiumtohavean
effect on doctor visits. Also, changes for recipients of social benefits have no
influences on their health care status because their premiums are paid by the
employment office if they are not employed and not insured together with a
family member.Hence,there appear to be no other changes which influences
treatment group and control group in a different way.
A second problem for our identification strategy may occur if the individuals
modify their behavior in terms of doctor visits in anticipation of the reform.
Our outcome variable is measured one year before the introduction of the
copayments.At this point in time,the copayments have not been discussed by
German politicians.Even if so,there would hardly have been any incentive to
changebehavioralreadyatthispointintime.Therefore,theproblemofantici-
pation effects (Ashenfelter 1978) should not be of importance for our em-
pirical analysis.
4. Results
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the probability to visit a doctor for the
three specifications of the control group providing an unconditional dif-
ference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect. The table shows that
persons covered by the social insurance system have a significantly higher
probability to visit a doctor when compared to persons covered by private
health insurance. In addition, adults show a significant higher probability to
visit a doctor than youths at the age 17. No significant differences appear
between adults younger than 20 and youths at age 17. Over time, the proba-
bility to visit a doctor does not change significantly for neither group. These
10 Boris Augurzky, Thomas K. Bauer and Sandra Schaffnerdifferences imply positive unconditional DiD-estimates of the treatment
effectforallthreespecificationsofthecontrolgroup.Inallcases,however,the
unconditional DiD-estimates are not statistically significant.
Table 4 shows an extraction of the results of different conditional DiD es-
timatesofthetreatmenteffect.4Thesecondcolumnofthetablereportsthees-
timated coefficients of a Logit regression with persons covered by social
healthinsuranceastreatmentgroupandpersonscoveredbyprivatehealthin-
surance as control group. Different to the unconditional DiD-estimates re-
ported in Table 3,the conditional DiD coefficient is negative and statistically
significant,suggesting that the copayments indeed reduced the probability to
visit a doctor. However, the estimated DiD coefficient becomes positive and
insignificantassoonaswecontrolforindividualheterogeneitybyestimatinga
fixed-effect logit model (column 3 of Table 4). A similar result appears when
usingthealternativedefinitionsofthetreatmentandcontrolgroup.Nomatter
whether we compare adults covered by social health insurance with indi-
viduals younger than 18 or adults aged 18 or 19 three months before the in-
terview with youths, the DiD-coefficient appears to be positiv and insig-
nificant (columns 4 and 5 of Table 4).
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Estimation Results
2003 2005 Difference 03–05






































Youths as control group,18-and 19-year old as treatment group



















ble 1 are due to differences in the chosen subsamples.
Table 3
4 The full set of estimation results is available from the authors upon request.Table 5 displays the results when we allow for heterogenous treatment effects
by analyzing different subgroups: men, women, West-Germans, East-
Germans, individuals of different education levels, and household income
groups, respectively. Throughout Table 5 we are using persons covered by
privatehealthinsuranceascontrolgroup.Notcontrollingforindividualheter-
ogeneity we find significant and negative coefficients for the subgroup of
West-Germans, individuals with a university degree, and – at a significance
level of 10% – in the lowest income quartile.Note,however,that all estimated
treatmenteffectsbecomeinsignificantwhencontrollingforindividualhetero-
geneity by estimating a fixed-effect-Logit model.
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Selected Results of DiD-Regressions with Different Control Groups
Social vs.Private Adults vs.Youths


























Number of observations 34,399 9,406 30,973 678
Authors’ calculations based on GSOEP data.– Absolute z-values are in parentheses.
Table 4
Summarized Results of DiD-Regressions for Different Subgroups
Logit FE-Logit
DiD z-value DiD z-value
All –0.233 –2.04 0.065 0.79
Men –0.194 –1.34 0.012 0.12
Women –0.253 –1.32 0.062 0.48
West-Germany –0.247 –2.00 0.056 0.64
East-Germany –0.090 –0.30 –0.045 –0.22
Highest educational achievement
Secondary School –0.109 –0.41 –0.202 –0.88
Intermediate School 0.069 0.29 0.162 0.94
Technical School –0.435 –0.74 –0.108 –0.19
Upper Secondary School 0.066 0.17 0.592 1.97
University Degree –0.428 –2.28 –0.184 –1.42
Quantile of household net income
First quartile –0.665 –1.92 –0.629 –1.39
Second quartile –0.062 –0.25 –0.088 –0.23
Third quartile –0.089 –0.42 0.185 0.80
Fourth quartile –0.269 –1.40 0.030 0.23
Authors’ calculations based on GSOEP data.
Table 55. Conclusion
Using the German Socioeconomic Panel we investigated the impact of the in-
troduction of a copayment of 10 euros for doctor visits on the probability to
visitadoctor.Sinceyouthsandpersonscoveredbyprivatehealthinsurancedo
not have to pay these copayments it is possible to use two different control
groups in a difference-in-differences approach. Our empirical results suggest
that the introduction of the copayment did not have a significant effect on the
probability of visiting a doctor.Nor for different subgroups of gender,region,
education,and income can significant effects be measured if individual heter-
ogeneity is controlled for.
These findings are in contrast to the public opinion and the descriptive sta-
tistics stating that the health care reform resulted in a decrease of cases of
medical treatment for family doctors as well as medical specialists. This dif-
ference might be explained partly by the fact that after the reform patients
avoid doctor visits if they only want to collect a prescription by clustering all
possible visits to one date and by using bigger package sizes of prescribed
drugs. Conditional on any doctor visit within a quarter, however, the number
of visits does not alter.
Our findings suggest that the copayments – as introduced in the health care
reform of 2004 – appear not to be effective to cut health care costs.We believe
that this ineffectiveness is a direct result of the design of the copayments. Pa-
tients have to pay the fee only for their first visit of a doctor in a quarter.Em-
pirical results from North America indicate that charging a fee for every
doctor visit may be more effective in reducing health care costs even if the
copayment per doctor visit is reduced.
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2003 2005 2003 2005
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Doctor visits last 3 months (yes/no) 0.705 0.456 0.709 0.454 0.657 0.475 0.671 0.470
Gender (male) 0.457 0.498 0.456 0.498 0.611 0.488 0.614 0.487
Age (year) 48.06 17.24 48.98 17.13 48.35 14.77 48.87 14.46
Net Household income (¤) 2429 1262 2361 1275 3650 2076 3575 1850
West-Germany 0.722 0.448 0.717 0.451 0.863 0.344 0.866 0.341
Married 0.636 0.481 0.631 0.483 0.667 0.471 0.670 0.470
Employed 0.552 0.497 0.553 0.497 0.713 0.452 0.730 0.444
Highest educational achievement
Secondary School 0.401 0.490 0.401 0.490 0.179 0.383 0.169 0.375
Intermediate School 0.279 0.449 0.288 0.453 0.228 0.420 0.237 0.426
Technical School 0.026 0.158 0.028 0.165 0.036 0.186 0.036 0.186
Upper Secondary School 0.063 0.243 0.069 0.254 0.104 0.305 0.096 0.294
University degree 0.150 0.357 0.162 0.368 0.422 0.494 0.448 0.497
Children (< 6 years;yes/no) 0.169 0.469 0.155 0.447 0.173 0.482 0.163 0.458
Hours worked (per week) 20.36 20.78 20.00 20.82 29.73 22.74 29.53 22.62
Number of observations 16,134 14,519 1,960 1,786
Authors’ calculations based on GSOEP data.
Table 6